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We can therefore trace the effects of a cause as long as events are worth noticing, and in the same way we
must not stop at the testing of a means for the immediate object, but test also this object as a means to a
higher one, and thus ascend the series of facts in succession, until we come to one so absolutely necessary in
its nature as to require no examination or proof. In many cases, particularly in what concerns great and
decisive measures, the investigation must be carried to the final aim, to that which leads immediately to
peace.
It is evident that in thus ascending, at every new station which we reach a new point of view for the judgment
is attained, so that the same means which appeared advisable at one station, when looked at from the next
above it may have to be rejected.
The search for the causes of events and the comparison of means with ends must always go hand in hand in
the critical review of an act, for the investigation of causes leads us first to the discovery of those things
which are worth examining.
This following of the clue up and down is attended with considerable difficulty, for the farther from an event
the cause lies which we are looking for, the greater must be the number of other causes which must at the
same time be kept in view and allowed for in reference to the share which they have in the course of events,
and then eliminated, because the higher the importance of a fact the greater will be the number of separate
forces and circumstances by which it is conditioned. If we have unravelled the causes of a battle being lost,
we have certainly also ascertained a part of the causes of the consequences which this defeat has upon the
whole War, but only a part, because the effects of other causes, more or less according to circumstances, will
flow into the final result.
The same multiplicity of circumstances is presented also in the examination of the means the higher our point
of view, for the higher the object is situated, the greater must be the number of means employed to reach it.
The ultimate object of the War is the object aimed at by all the Armies simultaneously, and it is therefore
necessary that the consideration should embrace all that each has done or could have done.
It is obvious that this may sometimes lead to a wide field of inquiry, in which it is easy to wander and lose the
way, and in which this difficulty prevails--that a number of assumptions or suppositions must be made about
a variety of things which do not actually appear, but which in all probability did take place, and therefore
cannot possibly be left out of consideration.
When Buonaparte, in 1797,[*] at the head of the Army of Italy, advanced from the Tagliamento against the
Archduke Charles, he did so with a view to force that General to a decisive action before the reinforcements
CHAPTER V. CRITICISM 72
 On War
expected from the Rhine had reached him. If we look, only at the immediate object, the means were well
chosen and justified by the result, for the Archduke was so inferior in numbers that he only made a show of
resistance on the Tagliamento, and when he saw his adversary so strong and resolute, yielded ground, and left
open the passages, of the Norican Alps. Now to what use could Buonaparte turn this fortunate event? To
penetrate into the heart of the Austrian empire itself, to facilitate the advance of the Rhine Armies under
Moreau and Hoche, and open communication with them? This was the view taken by Buonaparte, and from
this point of view he was right. But now, if criticism places itself at a higher point of view--namely, that of
the French Directory, which body could see and know that the Armies on the Rhine could not commence the
campaign for six weeks, then the advance of Buonaparte over the Norican Alps can only be regarded as an
extremely hazardous measure; for if the Austrians had drawn largely on their Rhine Armies to reinforce their
Army in Styria, so as to enable the Archduke to fall upon the Army of Italy, not only would that Army have
been routed, but the whole campaign lost. This consideration, which attracted the serious attention of
Buonaparte at Villach, no doubt induced him to sign the armistice of Leoben with so much readiness.
[*] Compare Hinterlassene Werke, 2nd edition, vol. iv. p. 276 et seq.
If criticism takes a still higher position, and if it knows that the Austrians had no reserves between the Army
of the Archduke Charles and Vienna, then we see that Vienna became threatened by the advance of the Army
of Italy.
Supposing that Buonaparte knew that the capital was thus uncovered, and knew that he still retained the same
superiority in numbers over the Archduke as he had in Styria, then his advance against the heart of the
Austrian States was no longer without purpose, and its value depended on the value which the Austrians
might place on preserving their capital. If that was so great that, rather than lose it, they would accept the
conditions of peace which Buonaparte was ready to offer them, it became an object of the first importance to
threaten Vienna. If Buonaparte had any reason to know this, then criticism may stop there, but if this point
was only problematical, then criticism must take a still higher position, and ask what would have followed if
the Austrians had resolved to abandon Vienna and retire farther into the vast dominions still left to them. But
it is easy to see that this question cannot be answered without bringing into the consideration the probable
movements of the Rhine Armies on both sides. Through the decided superiority of numbers on the side of the
French-- 130,000 to 80,000--there could be little doubt of the result; but then next arises the question, What
use would the Directory make of a victory; whether they would follow up their success to the opposite
frontiers of the Austrian monarchy, therefore to the complete breaking up or overthrow of that power, or
whether they would be satisfied with the conquest of a considerable portion to serve as a security for peace?
The probable result in each case must be estimated, in order to come to a conclusion as to the probable
determination of the Directory. Supposing the result of these considerations to be that the French forces were
much too weak for the complete subjugation of the Austrian monarchy, so that the attempt might completely
reverse the respective positions of the contending Armies, and that even the conquest and occupation of a
considerable district of country would place the French Army in strategic relations to which they were not
equal, then that result must naturally influence the estimate of the position of the Army of Italy, and compel it
to lower its expectations. And this, it was no doubt which influenced Buonaparte, although fully aware of the
helpless condition of the Archduke, still to sign the peace of Campo Formio, which imposed no greater
sacrifices on the Austrians than the loss of provinces which, even if the campaign took the most favourable
turn for them, they could not have reconquered. But the French could not have reckoned on even the
moderate treaty of Campo Formio, and therefore it could not have been their object in making their bold
advance if two considerations had not presented themselves to their view, the first of which consisted in the
question, what degree of value the Austrians would attach to each of the above-mentioned results; whether,
notwithstanding the probability of a satisfactory result in either of these cases, would it be worth while to
make the sacrifices inseparable from a continuance of the War, when they could be spared those sacrifices by
a peace on terms not too humiliating? The second consideration is the question whether the Austrian [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]